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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW LIMITING THE HOURS OF LABOR BY
EMPLOYEES OF CONTRACTORS ON MUNICIPAL WORK.
The trend of modern legislation, both in England and in the
United States, regarding the labor question, and the hours and
wages of the working classes, affords an interesting study. In the
various labor trades and crafts, a decided change has been
wrought during the last few decades. Not only has much real
progress been made in shortening the hours of woman and child
labor, but to all sorts of mechanical industry, and even unskilled
labor a protection has been given which fifty years ago was hardly
hoped for. Much of this change is directly due to the organiza-
tion of trade unions and kindred societies, yet, to a very con-
siderable extent it is the result of legislation. The labor, in-
fluenced by this latter agency, may be classified under two heads:
that which by its nature is extremely exhaustive or unhealthy,
and that which is employed by the state or state agencies. Of
this latter class, is the law the constitutionality of which is in
question in the case of The People of the State of Arew York ex
rel. Williams Engineering and Contracting Company v. Herman
Metz. N. Y. Law Journal, Vol. XL., No. 22.
The relator claimed to be entitled to payment from the City of
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New York, the sum of $9,634.75, for work performed under a
contract of November 6th, 1907. Payment was refused on the
ground that the relator violated the "Labor Law," which pro-
vided that no laborer, workman, or mechanic employed upon
work by or for the state or a municipal corporation or by con-
tractors or sub-contractors therewith, shall be permitted or re-
quired to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day,
except in cases of extraordinary emergency, and that such labor
shall be paid for at the rate prevailing in the locality where the
work is (lone. The present law is practically a re-enactment of
the Labor Law of 1897, which was declared unconstitutional by
the cases of People ex rel. Treat v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 144, and
People er rel. Rodgcrs v. Coler, 166 N. Y. i. In the last men-
tioned case, the court held as unconstitutional the first Labor Law,
because it denied to the city and its contractor, the right to agree
with their employees upon the terms of employment. The court
in the present case, bases its decision on the amendment to the
constitution which was adopted in 19o5. The purpose of this
amendment was to overcome the decisions in the above-men-
tioned cases, and while the court expressly approves the pre-
vious cases, still its reasoning is not in accord with the principles
there laid down, and is more in line with the dissenting opinions
of Chief Justice Parker, in one of which he said:
"Legislatures have .always provided for the duties and com-
pensation of the officers, the state, counties and cities, and indeed
the compensation for every kind and character of service What-
soever, has always been fixed by the legislature; directly or
through agencies created by it. There is no valid distinction in
this respect between the state, county and town officers, and
ordinary laborers employed for the state."
This opinion seems to be in harmony with the quotations which
the court cites with approval from the cases of Alkin v. Kansas,
191 U. S. 2o7: "We can imagine no possible ground to dispute
the power of the state to declare that no one undertaking work
for it, or one of its municipal agencies, should permit or require
an employee on such work to labor in excess of eight hours each
day." It would therefore appear that the decision in the present
case could be upheld without regard to the constitutional amend-
ment above referred to, and such a holding would have been in
line Wvith the case of Clark v. State of New York, 142 N. Y. ioi,
in which the court said: "There is no express or implied re-
COMMENTS.
strictions to be found in the constitution, upon the power of the
legislature to fix and declare the rate of compensation to be paid
for labor or services performed upon the public work of the
state." The court then went on to state that as such legislation
was not in conflict with the constitution, the matter is one with
which the courts have no concern.
As far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the right
of a State to discriminate between municipal corporations and pri-
vate idividuals, was settled by the United States Supreme Court in
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, and Atkin v. Kansas, supra.
Previously, the decisions in some states, showed a tendency to ex-
tend to municipal corporations, in matters affecting their property
and private contract rights, practically the same immunity from
legislatative interference as is accorded to business corporations
and private citizens. Weismer v. Village of Douglass, 64 N. Y. 91;
Board of Park Commissioners v. Common Council of Detroit, 28
Mlich. 228. The court in the last mentioned case laid down the
following rule: "The constitutional principle, that no person
shall be deprived of property without due process of law, applies
as well to municipal corporations in their private capacity as to
corporations for manufacturing and commercial purposes."
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY.
The recent decisions of the Court of Appeals of New York, in
the cases of Rhodes v. The Sperry & Hutchinson Company, 4o
N. Y., Law Journal, No. 28, and Wyatt v. James McCreery Com-
pany, III N. Y. Sup. 86, declaring constitutional the act passed
by the legislature on April 6, 1903, authorizing a suit to restrain
the use for advertising purposes of a person's picture, and for
damages unless the written consent of such person, or if a minor,
of his parent, has been previously obtained, N. Y. Laws, 1903,
Chapt. 132, § 2, are most important, for they now insure the en-
forcement of the right of privacy by statutory enactment in a
jurisdiction wherein the Courts of Equity had previously denied
relief.
This doctrine, which is in reality founded on the right of a
person "to pass through the world without having his picture
published without his consent, or his business interfered with, or
his successful experiments and works published, or his eccentrici-
ties commented upon in handbills, periodicals, or newspapers,"
has been traced as far back as 1820, when the Courts of Equity
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granted an injunction to restrain the employee of a physician from
making use of or communicating certain receipts which he had
surreptiously copied, on the ground that it was a breach of trust
and confidence. Yovatt v. Wingard, I J. & W. 394. In like man-
ner, injunctions were granted restraining the recipient of private
letters from publishing them on the ground that he only had them
for the qualified purpose for which they were sent to him, Gee v.
Pritchard, 2 Swaust. 4o2; a pupil from publishing the lectures
of a professor, on the ground that it was a breach of.confidence
on the part of the pupil, who was admitted to hear them only for
his own information, and not for sale and profit by him; Aber-
nathy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Chancery 209 (1825) ; a person from
exhibiting and publishing a descriptive catalogue of private etch-
ings which the Queen and Prince were having.printed for them-
selves, on the ground that it was a breach of trust and confidence,
and a violation of their property right, Prince Albert v Strange,
2 De G. & S. 652 (1849) ; and a photographer from making, ex-
hibiting and selling copies of a photograph of a woman who had
had her picture taken by him, on the ground of implied contract
not to use the negative for any purpose other than to supply the
applicant with a number of copies of it for a specified sum.
Pollard v. Photo Co., L. R. 4o, Chanc. Div. 345 (1888).
Thus, in all cases up to 189o, the courts based their decisions
either on the recognition of the violation of the right of property,
or on the ground that the publication would be a breach of
contract, confidence or trust, rather than recognize the Right of
Privacy. It was during that year, however, that this doctrine first
gained definite expression in an article in Scribner's Magazine,
for July, entitled, "The Rights of the Citizen to his Reputation,"
by E. L. Godkin, Esq., and in a most enthusiastic treatise on the
".Right of Privacy," in 4 Harvard Law Review, 193, which said:
"Notwithstanding the unanimity of the courts in resting their
decisions upon property rights in cases where the publication is
prevented by injunction, in reality, such prevention was due to the
necessity of affording protection to thoughts and sentiments ex-
pressed through the medium of writing, printing, and the arts,
... . in other words, that the principle actually involved
though not always appreciated, was that of inviolate personality
and not that of private property." This article was soon answered
by the Northwestern Review, Vol. IIL p. i, which siated that
"Equity had no concern with the feelings of an individual, or with
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the consideration of moral fitness, except as the inconvenience or
discomfort which the person may suffer, is connected with the
possession or enjoyment of property."
The courts then began to take cognizance of this right in decid-
ing their cases, and in the same year, by injunction, restrained
the sale of photographs of an actress taken by flashlight and with-
out her consent, while she was playing her r6le in a theatre.
Memola v. Stevens N. Y. (not reported.) Two years later, in the
case of Scheyler v. Curtiss, 64 Hun. N. Y. 594, the near relatives
of Mrs. Scheyler sought an injunction to restrain the erection of
a life-sized statue to her memory, which was to be designated as
the "Typical Philanthropist" at the Columbian Exposition. The
Court granted it on the ground that the wishes of her near rela-
tives must control-that a stranger had no right to invade the
right of privacy, which attaches to a person when living and to
her memory when dead. This case was appealed and in 147 N.
Y- 434, (19o5) the court, in reversing the decision, only recognized
the right of privacy in the dictum, when it said that "even though
the right did exist, it did not survive the death of the person to
the perpetuation of whose memory it was sought to erect a
statue." About the same time another interesting case arose, in
which an action was brought to restrain the publication of a
biography and picture of one Mr. Corliss, on the ground that it
was a violation of the Right of Privacy. The lower court granted
the injunction, but on appeal, it appeared that Mr. Corliss was a
public character, and the judgment was reversed. The court
holding that a private individual, because of his personal and
property rights, could be protected from the publication of his
portrait in any form, but as he became known before the public
he waived that right, and consequently could not restrain the
publicity of his portrait. Corliss v. Walker, 57 Fed. Rep. 434. 64
Fed. Rep. 28o. Another phase of this question is well illustrated
in the case of Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 372 (1899), where
the widow of a well-known lawyer sought to enjoin a cigar manu-
facturer from using his name and portrait upon the boxes of
cigars which he manufactured. The court dismissed the suit on
the ground that all authoritative cases similar to this were based
on property or contractual rights, and as her husband would
have been unable to secure relief had he himself been alive, so
were his survivors.
The direct question, however, as to the existence or non-
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existence of the Right of Privacy which was enforceable in the
Courts of Equity, did not arise until 19Ol, when the case of
Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, was
presented to the New York Courts. In that case an action was
brought by a young woman to restrain a Flour Milling Company
from using her likeness with the words "Flour of the Family"
written above it, without her consent, for the purpose of advertis-
ing its goods, on the ground that it was an invasion of the Right
of Privacy and that it caused her great mental and physical dis-
tress, necessitating the employment and attendance of a physician.
The court, after much difficulty, decided against its existence by
the vote of four to three. Judge Parker in his decision, declared
that because of the then existing condition of the law, the Right
of Privacy could not be enforced in the Court of Equity to restrain
such an action, but he expressly said: "The legislative body
could very well interfere and arbitrarily provide that no one should
be permitted, for his own selfish purpose, to use the picture or the
name of another for advertising purposes without his consent."
Judge. Gray dissented very strongly to this decision and urged
that as the protective power of equity is not exercised upon tan-
gible things, but upon the right to enjoy them-it should be called
for the protection of the right which is in one's exclusive
possession as a property right, in this case, viz: the right of an
individual to the peculiar cast of his own features.
The legislature, acting in accordance with the recommendation
of the court, passed the suggested statute, (N. Y. Laws, 1903,
Chapt. 132, § 2) within a short time and it was on the question
of the constitutionality of this statute that the case of Wyatt v.
James McCreery Co., and Rhodes v. The Sperry & Hutchinson
Company were appealed. In the former case, when an action was
brQught to restrain a photographer from using, for advertising
purposes, the picture of an infant which he had photographed at
a reduced rate with the oral understanding that she was to relen-
quish to the photographer all rights of reproducing and disposing
of the pictures, on the ground that the written consent of her
parent or guardian had not been obtained, the court held that
this was in violation of the statute requiring the written consent
of the parent or guardian of the minor before her picture could
be used for advertising purposes, and as the act was constitutional
in that respect, the photographer could be restrained. Ii N: Y.
Sup. 86. In the latter case, an action was brought in the lower
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court by a young woman to restrain a Trading Stamp Company
from exhibiting her picture, without her consent, written or other-
wise, among their premium exhibits which were exchanged for
trading stamps, on the ground that it was in violation of the
statute requiring her consent to be given in writing before her
pictures could be used for advertising purposes. The lower court
granted the injunction and $i,ooo damages. On appeal from this
decision on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the statute,
both the Brooklyn Appellate Division, 12o N. Y. App. Div. 467,
and the Court of Appeals, on October twenty-third last, upheld
it as constitutional. The Court of Appeals in discussing its opera-
tion, held that it was entirely prospective in its nature and hence
did not apply to pictures-acquired prior to the enactment of this
statute.
Directly opposed to this New York doctrine are cases which have
been decided by the Courts of Georgia and New Jersey, expressly
recognizing the doctrine as being enforceable without the assis-
tance of legislative enactment. In the first of the cases, Pave-
sich v. The New England Life Insurance Company, 122 Geo. 19o ,
(I9o4), the court held that the publication of an advertisement by
an insurance company containing a persons pictufe and statements
that he had policies of insurance with the company and was
pleased with the investment, when in fact he had no such policies,
and had never given consent to the publication of his picture,
was a trespass on the person's Right of Privacy and could be
restrained. The court traced the doctrine from the very instincts
of nature and said the Roman Law recognized it. They especially
commended the dissenting opinion of Judge Gray, in the Robert-
son v. Rochester Folding Box Co. Case, 171 N. Y. 538 This
decision has been recently followed in the case of Edison v.
Edison Polyforin Co., 67 At. Rep. 392, N. J. (1907) in which
the Court of Equity granted an injunction to restrain the unau-
thorized use of Mr. Edison's name, picture, and pretended certi-
ficates by a manufacturing company in which Mr. Edison was not
interested on the ground that it was a violation of the Right of
Privacy. The court, in discussing the case, distinctly repudiates
the New York doctrine, and says: "If it is recognized that a
man's name is his own property, it is difficult to understand why
the peculiar cast of one's features is not also one's property, and
why its pecuniary value, if it has one, does not belong to its
owner, rather than to the person seeking to make an unauthorized
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use of it," and concludes by saying "it would be difficult to imagine
a case in which the preventative relief would be more appropriate
than the present."
On the kindred question of the right of the police department
to take the photograph and Bertillion measurements of a person
arrested on the suspicion of having committed a crime, and place
them in the Rogue's Gallery previous to the trial of the accused,
the New York Courts have assumed an attitude similar to that
taken in the case of Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171
N. Y. 538, and have held that a mandatory injunction, to sur-
render the negative and destroy the measurements, when the ac-
cused was acquitted of the charge, on the ground that his Right
of Privacy had been invaded, would not lie. Owens v. Partridge,
82 N. Y. Sup. 248 (19o3). The Louisiana Courts, however, have
followed the broader doctrine, similar to that of Georgia and New
Jersey, and have declared in the cases of Schulman v. Whitaker,
117 La. 7o4 (I9o6), and Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La. 7o8
(i9o6), wherein persons who had been arrested on the suspicion
of having received stolen property, had had their photographs
and Bertillion measurements taken previous to the trial, were
subsequently acquitted of the charge, that the police department
did not have the right to subject the accused to such embarrass-
ments until after they were convicted unless it was absolutely
necessary for identification of a convict, hardened criminal, or
fugitive from justice. Their decisions were based on the grounds
that the personal Right of Privacy of the accused had been
violated and that such actions should be restrained until after
conviction, for, otherwise, persons would often be permanently
stamped as dishonest, whereas, in fact, they were entirely
innocent of the crime of which they were charged.
The Louisiana doctrine may, in this respect, appeal to our sense
of justice, but in comparing the New York doctrine with that of
Georgia, New Jersey and Louisiana in other respects, it seems
that the New York doctrine is more sound, for by-the legislative
enactment the same result is accomplished, and it confines the
doors of equitable jurisprudence to reasonable bounds, and does
not open them to the vastamount of litigation which often would
border on the absurd because of the impossibility to restrain and
confine them to their proper limits.
POLICE POWER OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has again been called upon to
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decide whether a city may pass an ordinance excluding children
from the public schools who have not been vaccinated. In People
ex rel. Jenkins v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 84 N.
E. io46, decided in April, i9o8, it was unanimously held that
the general police powers granted to a city to regulate health and
suppress disease, do not include the passage of an ordinance mak-
ing vaccination a condition precedent to the right of education.
That, in the absence of special authority given to the city, such
an ordinance can be justified only when it appears that the course
taken is necessary, or reasonably appears to be necessary, as in
case of an existing or threatened epidemic and to prevent the
spread of disease. The health commission of a city is a purely
ministerial office and has no legislative powers whatever.
For some years there has been an apparent conflict of authority
upon the point involved, and yet, upon a critical analysis of the
decisions made by the various courts before whom the question
has arisen, the conclusion is inevitable, that, although the decisions
in some cases differ from those of the Illinois Courts, yet the
principle of law by which the decisions have been reached are in
effect the same.
There is no doubt but that a state legislature has a right to
pass such acts as the one in question; for education is a privilege
or advantage, rather than a technical right. It is granted by the
state to be used and enjoyed upon such reasonable terms and
conditions as the law-making power may see fit to impose. As
to this, all the authorities are agreed. See Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal.
226.
In Duffield v. Williamsport School District, 162 Pa. St. 476, it
was held that school directors might pass a resolution excluding
children from the schools who had not been vaccinated and that
such a resolution would be valid. This is the case usually relied
upon in arguments favoring the validity of local vaccination acts,
but it is as frequently used to aid arguments urging the contrary.
In the city of Williamsport, there was an epidemic of smallpox
at the time the ordinance was enacted, and upon examination, the
real doctrine of the case is found to be that conditions and emer-
gencies may arise which will compel a school board to pass regula-
tions excluding certain persons from the schools, unless they
comply with certain requirements, even though the board has
no special legislative authority. To say the case holds that such
exclusion acts may be passed at any time, and under any circum-
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stances, is to give the opinion a construction that, in view of the
facts disclosed, was certainly never intended. The court makes
no mention of the board's right to exclude children under a gen-
eral authority, and, at the most, the admission of this right can
only be implied. In any event, assuming that there is such a right
admitted, the court qualifies it by saying that it can exist only
at the time and under the conditions already stated.
Bissell v. Davidson, 65 Conn. 183, is another case in
which it was decided that a school committee might
pass a similar act, although there was not a single case
of smallpox in the town. But the court does not base
its decision upon the ground of implied authority under
a general act giving a right to regulate health conditions, for here
there was a special act passed by the Connecticut Legislature giv-
ing the school committee the right to exclude children who had
not been vaccinated. In this case the question really in issue was
whether the legislature had the power to pass such an act, and
in conformity with the other decisions on the same point, the court
had decided that such power did exist, and was vested in the
Legislature, and hence the act of the school committee was valid.
In citing this case, the existence of the special statute is often
overlooked, and this frequently causes a misinterpretation of the
opinion.
So it can be readily seen that instead of holding that local
authorities may pass such vaccination acts at' any and all times
under a general law, these two cases merely hold that there are
two instances in which these acts may be valid, viz: one, when
there is a special statute conferring authority; and two, where an
epidemic exists or may reasonably be apprehended and there is no
special act conferring power on the municipal authorities.
All the courts holding such ordinances or resolutions invalid,
recognize the two exceptions laid down in the foregoing cases,
and do not hesitate to apply them when the occasion arises. The
question has arisen many times and particularly in the Western
States. The Jenkins case follows the doctrine of School Directors
v. Breen, 6o Ill. App. 201, and Lawbaugh v. Board of Education,
177 II. 572. The latter case.reverses Lawbaugh v. Board of
Education, supra. In the case last cited, the court disapproved
of the decision in School Directors v. Breen (supra), and claimed
Duffield v. Williamsport School District as an authority, although
in the case under its consideration, unlike the Duffield case, an
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epidemic did not exist nor was it threatened. The Supreme Court
in its reversing opinion, held that to justify such an ordinance,
authority for its enactment must have been expressly conferred or
a public emergency must have existed requiring its passage. In
Osborn v. Russell, 64 Kan. 507, the opinion was practically the
same as the foregoing. There it was held that in the absence of
special authority from the state legislature or where there was
no epidemic or danger of one, the Board of Education did not
have the power to exclude non-vaccinated children from the
schools.
There are numerous other cases all united in holding that to
support the passage of such acts by municipal authorities, power
must either have been specially conferred, or there must be an
actual or threatened epidemic. See Mathews v. Board of Educa-
tion, 127 Mich. 530; Blue v. Beach, 155 Mo. 121; State v. Burdge,
93 Wis. 390 (here the court went to the extent of holding that
the legislature could not even delegate such power to a munic-
ipality), State v. Zimmerman, 86 Minn. 353. In the latter case
it was held, that legislative grants of power to municipalities
should receive a broad interpretation, and that a general grant
of power might give the right to pass such ordinances as those
under consideration. But here there was an epidemic, and the
court very clearly indicates that, to support such action under a
general authority, it was necessary to prove the existence of the
epidemic.
There is one decision, however, which it is impossible to re-
concile with any of the leading cases. In Matter of Rebenack,
62 Mo. App. 8, it was held, whether the general school law which
vests school boards with the power to exclude all children from
the schools who are liable to transmit infectious or contagious
disease has any application to this board is really immaterial. No
one would, for a moment, question the existence of such power in
the board under the general grant to make all proper rules, ordin-
ances and statutes for the government and management of the
schools. The only question is whether the requirement of vac-
cination is a reasonable requirement to prevent transmission of a
contagious disease. On the authority of Clark v. Abeel (supra),
the court concluded that such a requirement was reasonable.
Here there was neither epidemic nor special power. This case was
decided in 1895 and is a relatively early case upon the subject.
It has not been followed in cases where like circumstances were
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present, nor should it be for it is to be noticed that the court
makes the statement that power will exist under a general
authority entirely unsupported by previous decisions. No authori-
ties are cited to support the proposition, and the statement seems
to have been rather ill-considered.
The weight of authority and good reasoning would seem to
indicate that, except in the two cases hitherto referred to, the
power to pass acts excluding children from schools because they
have not been vaccinated, is vested exclusively in the legislature,
and cannot be exercised by a municipality or any of its local
organs.
